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CASES NOTED

a state with favorable tax conditions. The case seems to be another step
in the attempt to eliminate multiple taxation of movable tangibles, and also
to eliminate payment tinder protest and its consequent bothersome and
expensive litigation for recovery,

TAXATION-PUBLIC POLICY-DEDUCTION OF "KICKBACKS"
AS ORDINARY AND NECESSARY BUSINESS EXPENSES
Plaintiffs, opticians, deducted as ordinary and necessary business cxpenses "kickbacks," paid to doctors who prescribed the glasses, of one-third
of the retail price. Held, that such deductions are not contrary to public
policy unless they frustrate sone national or state policy which has been
defined by some governmental declaration.

Lilly v. Commissioner of Inter-

nal Revenue, 72 Sup. Ct. 497 (1952).
The Internal Revenue Code provides that in computing net income
2
there shall be allowed as deductions from gross income all the ordinary
and necessary' expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying
on any trade or business. Certain limitations upon this general provision,
recognizing public policy, have been set forth. Criminal fines and penalties
are not deductible because to do so would in effect permit the taxpayer to

mitigate the punishment of the law.4 Legal fees spent in behalf of defending suits for violations of state and federal statutes have been disallowed
as not being "ordinary and necessary," while money spent in defending tort
actions has been allowed.- Commercial bribes have been disallowed as not
being "necessary" because the payor has an adequate remedy at law, and to
allow such accessions would be against public policy.6 Similarly, sums paid
by a corporate taxpayer under contingent fee contracts are not allowed, since
such sums are paid in execution of contracts which are void as against public policy.7
The instant decision, 8 one of first inprcssion, demonstrates the Supreme
Court's reluctance to permit lower courts to decide at their discretion what
I. INT. REV. COnk § 2 3 (a)(I)(A). 43 STAT. 269 (1924), 26 U.S.C. § 23(2)
(i) (1940).
2.4. NIERTON, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25.07 (Rev. ed. 1948)
("Ways of conduct and forms of speech prevailing in the business world will usually
furnish a reliable guide in determining whether the particular expense is an ordinary
expense of the business.").
3. Welch v. Commissioner, 290 U.S. 111 (1933) ("Ordinarily, an expense will be
considered necessary where the expenditure is appropriate and helpful in the development
of the taxpayer's business.").
4. Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931);
Great Northern R.R. v. Commissioner 40 F.2d 372 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S.
855 (1930).
5. Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928); ltelvering v. Hampton, 79
F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1935).
6. Kelley-Deipsey & Co. v.Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 351, 355 (1934).
7. Commissioner v. Textile Mills Securities Corp. 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
8.Lilly v. Commissioner, 72 Sup. Ct. 497 (1952).

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
constitutes an existing public policy. The court based its rationale upon the
theory that in the absence of a plain indication of policy through long governmental practice or statutory enactments, or of violations of obvious ethical
or moral standards, courts should not assume to declare such "kickback"
contracts contrary to public policy. In the years in which the plaintiffs
made such deductions there was no declared public policy proscribing such
payments as illegal. The court feels that such public policy is a matter to
be dealt with by legislation."
Prior to this decision taxpayers have had no reliable test to follow in
determining what expenses arc against public policy and hence non-deductible. The instant case presents a well-defined test which can be followed by
taxpayers and courts alike in determining such controversies. More and
clearer tests of this nature are needed to provide the taxpayer with a workable "yardstick" to use in measuring his liability under our complex
Revenue Code.

9. Today, such legislation has been adopted in the following states: CAL. Bus. &
650, 652 (1951); N.C. Laws, 1951 c. 1089, §§ 21, 23; WAsiz. REv.

PROF. CODE §§

STAT. ANN, § 10185-14 (1949).

